4. Self-exclusion
Enforcement via testing is a key component of court-supervised negative licenses – people who drink or take drugs in violation of the order face negative consequences imposed from without. People who voluntarily choose to be abstinent from alcohol or drugs do not face the same degree of testing and enforcement – though the illegality of some drugs typically does raise a barrier to use, relative to what would exist in a legal, lightly regulated market.
Voluntary abstainers might try to enforce their commitment. They might make a public pronouncement of their abstinence intention, so that any deviations from their plan might be noted by others and cause embarrassment. They might enlist their friends and family into serving as watchdogs and supporters of their commitment. They have the option of setting up enforceable contracts that would result in “fines” or other negative consequences if they stray from their declared path: see stickk.com. Even with these measures, the voluntarily abstemious generally lack the participation of sellers in preventing their alcohol or drug consumption. Indeed, sellers presumably have a pecuniary incentive to overcome the reluctance of wavering abstainers.
4.1 Gambling self-exclusion
Gambling jurisdictions around the globe have demonstrated the viability (and popularity) of a negative licensing system that can aid voluntary abstainers and recruit sellers into the enforcement mechanism: self-exclusion programs. In the US, adults are eligible to gamble by default: there is no positive licensing of gamblers. Nor are time or money limits generally imposed. Self-exclusion programs, however, allow individuals not only to opt out, but to do so in a manner that is binding for some time in the future. A person can (voluntarily) place himself on a self-exclusion list, and then he will not be permitted into casinos, nor keep any winnings if he evades the exclusion and manages to gamble anyway. For people who face severe self-control problems, a self-exclusion program can be a significant boon.
Self-exclusion presents a physical barrier to entry, and by confiscating winnings, renders any gambling that could take place in defiance of the ban to be less alluring. Self-excluders are removed from any promotional or frequent bettor plans, too, in an effort to limit temptations.
Without self-exclusion (or licensing), opting out of gambling requires those ongoing decisions to desist. The willpower to continue to abstain often proves wanting in those whose rationality with respect to wagering is most suspect. With a self-exclusion program, however, the opt-out can occur at any moment, and maintain a degree of enforceability for long periods of time. The new, voluntarily chosen default economizes on willpower, and has shown itself to be a valuable tool in curbing pathological gambling.[i]
One method of enforcing exclusions is to try to visually recognize excluded gamblers and to remove them from the gambling premises. Many jurisdictions allow trespassing charges to be brought against gamblers who attempt to enter a casino from which they have excluded. A more thorough enforcement regime involves checking the identification of all would-be gamblers, though such a regime would impose somewhat on the non-excluded. (Identification checks for relatively youthful gamblers might be necessitated by age restrictions in any case.) The collection of large jackpots from electronic gaming machines presents another enforcement mechanism. Jackpots in modern slots are not paid out directly by the machines; instead, receipts for credits are provided to the lucky player. Federal tax law necessitates that forms be filled out before winnings of $1,200 or more are disbursed, providing casinos with an opportunity to check names against the excluded list. As noted, these jackpots will be confiscated from excluded gamblers, with the proceeds in many jurisdictions earmarked for treatment of problem gaming.
The exclusion system can be extended to involuntarily excluded gamblers. Casinos do this on their own, barring individuals because of, for instance, prior cheating or criminal activity. But the more interesting extension concerns individuals who, like self-excluders, are problem gamblers or at-risk of becoming problem gamblers. For these people, family members might be empowered to initiate an intervention, one that could result in the involuntary exclusion of a gambler from betting locales. Singapore and Australia already make provision for such family exclusions; Singapore also automatically excludes from its casinos residents who are receiving public assistance or who are in bankruptcy.
In between voluntary and involuntary exclusions are exclusions that result from some active prodding. Gambling providers can track bettor behavior, and have personnel discreetly contact someone whose frequency or pace of wagering suggests potential problems. The casino employees (or officials empowered by the regulatory agency) might suggest counseling or self-exclusion, and provide information about these and other options. Casinos in the Netherlands must check, upon entry, the identification of all gamblers. These id checks facilitate the enforcement of exclusion orders, but they also track the frequency of entry; gamblers who enter a casino more than eight times in a month will be approached by casino personnel to discuss the possibility of control issues and self-exclusion.
4.2 Drug self-exclusion
Self-exclusion can be employed with the currently illegal drugs to set up a negative licensing system. First, consider a self-exclusion program in isolation, that is, as in the case of gambling, a self-exclusion program that is not combined with a positive licensing scheme. To be specific, imagine a self-exclusion system with respect to legal marijuana. Upon reaching the age of majority, all individuals would be licensed (implicitly) to purchase and consume limited quantities of marijuana. Users who are concerned that their marijuana use has become habitual and is detracting from their lives could choose to put themselves on the list of ineligible buyers. Presumably the method of enforcing the list would involve all marijuana customers producing identification, which then would be compared with the exclusion list.
All of the detailed provisions of exclusion that arise in the instance of gambling exclusions have precise parallels with drug exclusions. How long should an exclusion last? When an exclusion expires, is any positive step required for reinstatement of the (implicit) license to purchase marijuana? Would it be sensible to allow enforceable self-limits, partial exclusions that permit the purchase of restricted quantities of marijuana? (Note that such a non-zero option can be seamlessly provided as part of a positive licensing scheme.) Could family members initiate an intervention that could result in an enforceable exclusion?
Self-exclusion might be a good standalone option for the legalization of relatively soft or safe drugs like marijuana. For harder drugs, a positive licensing scheme might be a better route for legal provision, at least in the initial post-prohibition situation. For these harder drugs, a self-exclusion could supplement the positive licensing, where the exclusion would bar the possibility of receiving a license for some period in the future.
[i] See the relevant posts at the blog Self-exclusion, at http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/search/label/Effectiveness.
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