Saturday, May 7, 2011

Draft Three, Sections 3.2 through 3.4

3.2 Committing to Exclusion[i]

Enforcement via testing is a key component of court-supervised exclusions – people who drink or take drugs in violation of the order face negative consequences imposed from without. People who voluntarily choose to be abstinent from alcohol or drugs do not face the same degree of testing and enforcement – though the illegality of some drugs typically does raise a barrier to use, relative to what would exist in a legal, lightly regulated market.

Voluntary abstainers might try to enforce their commitment. They might make a public pronouncement of their abstinence intention, so that any deviations from their plan might be noted by others and cause embarrassment. They might enlist their friends and family into serving as watchdogs and supporters of their pledge. They have the option of setting up enforceable contracts that would result in “fines” or other negative consequences if they stray from their declared path: see stickk.com. Even with these measures, the voluntarily abstemious generally lack the participation of sellers in preventing their alcohol or drug consumption. Indeed, sellers presumably have a pecuniary incentive to overcome the reluctance of wavering abstainers.

3.3 Gambling self-exclusion

Gambling jurisdictions around the globe have demonstrated the viability (and popularity) of a commitment system that can aid voluntary abstainers and recruit sellers into the enforcement mechanism: self-exclusion programs. In the US, adults are eligible to gamble by default: no positive steps need be taken to acquire the privilege to gamble. Nor are time or money limits generally imposed. Self-exclusion programs, however, allow individuals not only to opt out, but to do so in a manner that is binding for some time in the future. A person can voluntarily place himself on a self-exclusion list, and then he will not be permitted into casinos, nor keep any winnings if he evades the exclusion and manages to gamble anyway. Many jurisdictions allow trespassing charges to be brought against gamblers who attempt to enter a casino from which they have excluded. For people who face severe self-control problems, a self-exclusion program can be a significant boon.

Self-exclusion presents a physical barrier to entry into a casino, and by confiscating winnings, renders less alluring any gambling that takes place in defiance of the ban. Self-excluders are removed from any promotional or frequent bettor plans, too, in an effort to limit temptations.

Without self-exclusion (or some sort of licensing of gamblers), opting out of gambling requires those ongoing decisions to desist. The willpower to continue to abstain often proves wanting in those whose rationality with respect to wagering is most suspect. With a self-exclusion program, however, the opt-out can occur at any moment, and maintain a degree of enforceability for long periods of time. The new, voluntarily chosen default economizes on willpower, and has shown itself to be a valuable tool in curbing pathological gambling and the problems induced by pathological gambling.[ii]

Gambling self-exclusion programs differ across a wide variety of dimensions, such as the duration of an exclusion. Most venues offer multiple choices for exclusion length, from six months, say, to five years. Other locales offer only one exclusion length; the state of Missouri provides a single option, though it is of variable duration: self-excluders sign up for a lifetime ban from the state’s thirteen casinos. Another important issue concerns what happens when a self-exclusion order (short of a lifetime ban) expires. In some cases, the person can immediately resume gambling. In Illinois, however, reinstatement requires not only that the period of exclusion be expired, but also that a counseling professional certify that the excluded individual is now capable of controlled gambling.

One method of enforcing exclusions is to try to visually recognize excluded gamblers and to remove them from the gambling premises. The Canadian province of Ontario currently is implementing a computer and camera-based face-recognition system to help enforce exclusion orders.[iii] A more laborious enforcement regime involves requiring identification from all would-be gamblers, though such a regime would impose somewhat on the non-excluded. (Identification checks for relatively youthful gamblers might be necessitated by age restrictions in any case.) The collection of large winnings from electronic gaming machines presents another enforcement mechanism. Jackpots in modern slots are not paid out directly by the machines; instead, receipts for credits are provided to the lucky player. US federal tax laws necessitate that forms be filled out before winnings of $1,200 or more are disbursed, providing casinos with an opportunity to check names against the excluded list. As noted, these jackpots will be confiscated from excluded gamblers, with the proceeds in many jurisdictions earmarked for treatment of problem gaming. Electronic tracking devices (sometimes employed for casino loyalty programs) can be used to enforce exclusions, too; furthermore, they can help implement partial exclusions, whereby gamblers set time or loss limits on their betting. Australia is considering mandating that all players of electronic gaming machines establish monetary limits before gambling.[iv]

The exclusion system can be extended to involuntarily excluded gamblers.[v] Casinos do this on their own, barring individuals because of, for instance, prior cheating or criminal activity. But the more interesting extension concerns individuals who, like self-excluders, are problem gamblers or at-risk of becoming problem gamblers. For these people, family members might be empowered to initiate an intervention, one that could result in the involuntary exclusion of a gambler from betting locales. Singapore and Australia already make provision for such family exclusions; Singapore also automatically excludes from its casinos residents who are receiving public assistance or who are in bankruptcy.[vi]

In between voluntary and involuntary exclusions are exclusions that result from some active prodding. Gambling providers can track bettor behavior, and have personnel discreetly contact someone whose frequency or pace of wagering suggests potential problems. The casino employees (or officials empowered by the regulatory agency) might suggest counseling or self-exclusion, and provide information about these and other options. Casinos in the Netherlands check, upon entry, the identification of all gamblers. These ID checks facilitate the enforcement of exclusion orders, but they also are used to track the frequency of entry; gamblers who enter a casino more than eight times in a month will be approached by casino personnel to discuss the possibility of control issues and self-exclusion.

3.4 Drug self-exclusion

As with mandated exclusion, self-exclusion can be employed with the currently illegal drugs as part of a legal regulatory system. To be specific, imagine a self-exclusion system with respect to legal marijuana. Upon reaching the age of majority, all individuals would be eligible to purchase and consume (perhaps limited) quantities of marijuana. Users who are concerned that their marijuana use has become habitual and is detracting from their lives could choose to put themselves on the list of ineligible buyers. Presumably the method of enforcing the list would involve all marijuana customers producing identification, which then would be compared with the exclusion list.

The detailed provisions of exclusion that arise in the instance of gambling exclusions have precise parallels with drug exclusions. How long should an exclusion last? When an exclusion expires, is any positive step required for reinstatement of the privilege to purchase marijuana? Would it be sensible to allow enforceable self-limits, partial exclusions that permit the purchase of restricted quantities of marijuana? Could family members initiate an intervention that could result in an enforceable exclusion? Different jurisdictions could experiment with different exclusion options, and a set of best practices could emerge: a dynamic that is ongoing in the case of gambling self-exclusion programs.[vii]

An alcohol-style regulatory system, enhanced with both mandatory and voluntary exclusion mechanisms, might be a good option for the legalization of relatively soft or safe drugs like marijuana. For harder drugs, however, a more stringent regulatory system might be a better route for legal provision, at least in the initial post-prohibition situation.



[i] The remainder of section 3 draws upon Leitzel (2011).

[ii] See the relevant posts at the blog Self-exclusion, at http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/search/label/Effectiveness.

[iii] http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/2011/04/enforcing-self-exclusion-through.html.

[iv] http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/2011/04/mandatory-gambling-limits-in-australia.html.

[v] The state of Missouri’s casino self-exclusion program developed when a problem gambler learned of the existence of mandatory exclusions, and asked if he could become excluded, too; see http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/2011/02/missouris-introduction-of-self.html.

[vi] http://selfexclusion.blogspot.com/2010/03/singapore-casino-exclusions-update.html.

[vii] Responsible Gambling Council (2008).

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